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Abstract
Grandparents are regular providers of free child care. Similar to other forms of
child care, availability of grandparent-provided child care affects fertility and labor
force participation of women positively. However, grandparent-provided child care
requires residing close to parents or in-laws. While living close can provide access
to free child care, it may also imply costly spatial restrictions. We find that moth-
ers residing close to parents or in-laws have lower wages and that the probability
of having to commute increases if relatives provide child care. We build a model
of residence choice, fertility, and female labor force participation that can account
for the relationships between grandparent-provided child care, fertility, and female
labor market outcomes. We simulate our model to analyze how women’s decisions
on residence, fertility, and labor force participation would change if the availability
of grandparent-provided child care or family policies were altered. We find that if
child care subsidies were raised to the Swedish level, fertility and mothers’ labor
force participation would increase, while mobility would remain unchanged. The
absence of grandparents, on the other hand, would increase mobility, while it would
have only limited negative effects on aggregate fertility and labor force participation.
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1 Introduction
Grandparents are an important source of child care. According to data from the 2nd
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), between 18%
(Denmark) and 49% (Italy) of grandparents take care of their grandchildren age six or
younger on a daily or weekly basis. More than 30% of grandparents in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Switzerland provide weekly care, whereas in Italy, Greece, and Poland al-
most 30% look after their grandchildren each day (see Figure A-1 of the Appendix A).1
The availability of child care and especially cheap or even costless child care has impor-
tant effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force participation. This is important, because
while female labor force participation has increased tremendously over the past decades,
mothers are still participating significantly less than other women.2
There exists an extensive empirical literature that studies the relationship between female
labor force participation and child care. Many papers propose a joint analysis of the effects
of child care costs on fertility and labor force participation. For Italy, Del Boca [2002]
shows that both the availability of child care and the possibility of part time work in-
crease labor force participation and fertility. Blau and Robins [1989] establish a similar
pattern for the US. Within the context of already high female labor force participation
rates in Sweden, Mo¨rck et al [2009] is one of the few papers that focuses exclusively on
the positive effect of lower child care costs on fertility. In a literature summary, Del Boca
and Vuri [2007] point out that most studies find that high child care costs deter female
labor supply, while availability of child care is found to have positive effects on mothers’
labor force participation. These findings suggest that the main barrier that mothers face
at the time of working is to obtain affordable child care.3
Free grandparent-provided child care seems to be the perfect solution for working mothers.
However, in order to enjoy grandparent-provided child care on a regular basis, residence
choices of adult children and elderly parents have to coincide. Data from the 2nd wave of
SHARE show that the frequency of grandparent-provided child care is clearly related to
the geographical distance between parents and their adult children. Figure 1.1 displays the
1In the US, 22.7% of children under 5 years are regularly cared for by their grandparents (Overturf
Johnson [2005]).
2Considering OECD countries, the average difference in labor force participation rates for women and
mothers (of children age 3 or younger) is around 10 (20) percentage points. Scandinavian countries are
an exception where labor force participation rates of mothers are equal to or even higher compared to
those of women in general, OECD [2008].
3For instance, for a US family living below the poverty line, child care costs amount to 30% of income
(US Census Bureau [2011]).
frequency of grandparent-provided child care, together with the geographical distance be-
tween grandparents and their grandchildren (age six and younger) for Germany, Denmark,
Italy, and Spain. Across the four selected countries the frequency of care varies strongly,
but common to all countries those who provide care more frequently tend to live close by.4
Figure 1.1: Frequency of Care for and Distance to Grandchild, ≤ 6
up to 5km 5-25km 25-100km more than 100km
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Daily Care Weekly Care Monthly or Less Frequent
Care
Germany
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Daily Care Weekly Care Monthly or Less Frequent
Care
Spain
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Daily Care Weekly Care Monthly or Less Frequent
Care
Denmark
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Daily Care Weekly Care Monthly or Less Frequent
Care
Italy
Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Hence, grandparent-provided child care – similar to other types of child care – may have
positive effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force participation. However, different
from other types of child care it imposes spatial restrictions which may affect female la-
bor market outcomes negatively. In this paper we document two different costs of spatial
restrictions. Looking at data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we find
that women residing close to parents or in-laws have lower hourly and monthly wages.
Furthermore, mothers are more likely to have to incur in commutes if their children are
regularly cared for by relatives. Similar to other studies, we also find that women residing
close to parents or in-laws are more likely to have children, and that as mothers they
are more likely to hold a regular full or part time job. Given strong interdependencies
of decisions regarding residence, fertility, child care arrangements, and female labor force
participation, our empirical analysis faces problems of endogeneity and reversed causality.
4The same pattern can be observed across the rest of the countries included in the SHARE data set;
see Figures A-3-A-2 of the Appendix A.
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By using geographical proximity between adult children and their parents as an indirect
measure of grandparent-provided child care, we address the interdependency of child care
arrangements and female labor force participation. However, certain caveats remain. For
instance, we cannot dismiss a reversed causality between geographical proximity and labor
market outcomes or fertility. To be able to better disentangle individuals’ decisions, we
then build a model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor force partici-
pation that can account for the observed relationships. We simulate our model to analyze
how women’s decisions on residence, fertility, and labor force participation would change
if the availability of grandparent-provided child care or family policies were altered. We
find that if child care subsidies were raised to the Swedish level, fertility and mothers’
labor force participation would increase, while mobility would remain unaltered. The
absence of grandparents, on the other hand, would increase mobility, while it would have
only limited negative effects on aggregate fertility and labor force participation.
The current paper contributes to the literature by being the first paper, to the best of
our knowledge, that explicitly incorporates spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-
provided child care into a model of fertility and labor force participation decisions. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is also the first one to document possible costs related to
the geographical proximity between parents and adult children. The existing literature,
on the contrary, has highlighted the positive aspects of geographical proximity between
parents and adult children. Studying fertility intentions rather than outcomes, Raymo et
al [2010] find that Italian and Japanese women living close to their parents have higher
fertility intentions. Holdswoth and Dale [2009] study labor force participation decisions of
mothers in Spain and Britain. They estimate that the probability of being in employment
is 1.24 times higher for Spanish women whose parents live in the same town (’municipio’).
For the US, Compton and Pollak [2011] find that married women with small children
living close to mothers and mothers-in-law have a 10 percentage point higher probability
to be in employment.
Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational time transfers. Most of
this literature focuses on time transfers from children to elderly parents. One interesting
paper that also incorporates residence choices is Konrad et al [2002]. The authors develop
a game theoretical model of strategic choice of residence among siblings who try to avoid
having to take care of elderly parents. Looking at German data, they find support for
their model’s predictions of older siblings locating further away from their parents than
younger siblings. With a similar approach in mind, Stern [1995] estimates care choices
of elderly parents together with location decisions of children. His work is closely related
to the current paper as he also takes into account how the child’s location decision af-
fects his or her work decision. Apart from the aforementioned paper by Compton and
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Pollak [2011], some of the few empirical works that consider time transfers from par-
ents to children in form of grandparent-provided child care are Dimova and Wolff [2011]
and Zamarro [2011]. Both studies use SHARE data and estimate simultaneous equation
models of labor supply and grandparent-provided child care. Zamarro [2011] only finds a
positive effect of grandparent-provided child care on mothers’ labor force participation for
Greece and the Netherlands. Dimova and Wolff [2011] also include financial transfers into
their model. For ten European countries the authors find a positive effect of grandparent-
provided child care on the extensive margin of female labor force participation but no
effect along the intensive margin. Two studies by Arpino et al [2010] and Posadas and
Vidal-Ferna´ndez [2012] for Italy and the US respectively, find that grandparent-provided
child care – instrumented by grandparents being alive – increases in particular labor force
participation of low educated mothers of young children. Alesina and Giuliano [2010]
argue that how much individuals choose to carry out certain activities within the family
– care of children or the elderly – is strongly determined by the value of family ties in a
society. The authors find that across countries a higher value of family ties is associated
with lower geographical mobility, higher fertility, but also with more traditional gender
roles and thus lower female labor force participation. In the current paper, on the con-
trary, grandparent-provided child care – indicating a higher value of family ties within a
country – is found to be related to higher female labor force participation.
Our paper is also part of the literature that uses general equilibrium models to assess
how different public policies interact with family decisions.5 Closely related is Cardia
and Ng [2003] who – different from the current paper – explicitly incorporate grandpar-
ents’ decisions into a general equilibrium model for grandparent-provided child care. The
authors suggest that subsidizing grandparents’ time is the most effective child care pol-
icy in terms of output and capital accumulation. However, the authors do not consider
the spatial restrictions and potential costs in terms of labor market outcomes implied by
grandparent-provided child care. Also related to this paper are the works by Bick [2010]
and Mendez [2008]. Within a life cycle model, the former analyzes data for Germany
and concludes that informal child care (by relatives) plays an important role given that
mothers’ labor force participation exceeds child care enrollment for children up to 2 years.
However, different from the current paper the author does not model relative-provided
child care, nor the spatial restrictions that it imposes. The paper by Mendez [2008]
attempts to account for differences in geographical mobility and female labor force par-
ticipation across European countries. His model of residence choice, fertility, and female
labor force participation is similar to ours, but the author does not provide any evidence
for individual costs associated with living close to parents or in-laws. Our aim is similar
5See for instance Attanasio et al [2010], Erosa et al [2010], Garc´ıa-Mora´n [2010], Greenwood et al [2000],
or Guner and Knowles [2009] among others.
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to these papers, as we assess the effects of the availability of grandparents and of differ-
ent family policies within a framework that explicitly incorporates the spatial restrictions
imposed by grandparent-provided child care. We then analyze how women’s decisions re-
garding residence, fertility, and labor force participation change under different scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents our empir-
ical analysis, Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 describes our calibration strategy,
Section 5 presents the results of the model, and in Section 6 we discuss the model’s mech-
anisms in detail. In Section 7 we perform two counterfactual experiments and Section 8
concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we consider data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The GSOEP is an annual household survey that has been carried out since
1984. The first sample in 1984 included 5,921 households with 16,205 individuals (76%
adults, 24% children) of which 44% still remained in the sample in 2004, after 20 years.
In addition, new samples for refreshment of the data and for specifically targeting certain
groups of the population (East Germans, foreigners, high-income individuals) were added
in 1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The GSOEP provides extensive information
on individuals’ labor market participation, marital and family status, wages, education,
the size of the town they live in etc.6
The GSOEP includes also variables of particular interest for our analysis: child care pro-
vided by relatives and geographical distance to parents. In four waves of the GSOEP
(1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006) survey participants were asked to categorize their parents’
relative residence as in: i) the same house, ii) the same neighborhood, iii) the same town,
iv) another town but within one hour by car, v) further away, or vi) in a foreign country.
We construct a dummy variable “parents or in-laws close” that takes on value one for
individuals whose mother, father, or in-law lives in the same neighborhood or town. For
individuals who live in the same house as their parents or in-laws we construct a different
dummy variable “parents or in-laws in same house.” This particular form of co-residence
mostly arises because young individuals still live at home or due to the need for intensive
care of parents, and in most cases it represents a temporary living arrangement. Only
in two of the four waves considered (2001 and 2006) did the household survey include
questions about relative-provided child care. We construct a dummy variable “child care
6For more details on the GSOEP and its development, see SOEP [2005].
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by relatives” that takes on value one for all mothers with children age six or younger if
relatives regularly take care of this child and a dummy variable “child care non-relatives”
that takes on value one if the child age six or younger attends a nursery or is being cared
for by others than relatives. We also report these variables for two different age groups, for
children up to the age of three and those between the ages of three and six. In Germany,
for children younger than three very few spots in public or publicly subsidized nurseries
are available, whereas for children between the ages of 3 and 6, those spots are almost
guaranteed.7
For our analysis we pool the data from the available four waves. We only consider women
age 25 to 50 living in Germany.8 We exclude those born outside of Germany, because
for these individuals both key variables of our analysis, (i) availability of child care by
relatives and (ii) residence relative to parents, might be determined by very different as-
pects. Given marked differences in mothers’ labor force participation rates between East
and West Germany, we introduce dummy variables to distinguish between individuals
living in East and West Germany.9 To account for possible cultural differences, we also
distinguish between individuals of German nationality and those of other nationalities.
We define three levels of education following the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED 1997) designed by the UNESCO[1997]. These levels correspond to (i)
primary education (ISCED levels 0 and 1), (ii) secondary education (ISCED levels 2, 3,
and 4 ), and (iii) tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6). Town sizes are grouped into
small communities (up to 20.000 inhabitants), medium-sized communities (20.000-100.000
inhabitants), and large communities (more than 100.000 inhabitants). We also construct
dummy variables for each federal state. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for women
and mothers.10
7According to data from the Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder [2011], in 2011 only
around 25.2% of children younger than age three attended some form of private day care (85%) or public
or publicly subsidized nurseries (15%), compared to 93.4% of children between three and six (less than
1% of them in private day care). Compulsory schooling for German children starts between the ages
of 6 and 7 and hence for older children the need for child care is drastically reduced due to the time
they spent in school. The variable ’regular child care by relatives’ includes child care by any relative but
turns out to be a good approximation for grandparent-provided child care given that among relatives it
is mostly grandparents who provide child care. In addition, even for child care by relatives other than
grandparents similar spatial restrictions apply.
8We exclude individuals living in East Germany from the 1991 wave, given that for this particular
wave information for most labor market variables (participation, wages) are missing for East Germans.
9Labor force participation rates of East German mothers of small children (0-3 years) have traditionally
been very high and even today they continue to be around 15 percentage points higher than rates for West
German mothers (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005].) In our sample,
labor force participation rates of mothers are 67% and 48% respectively in East and West Germany.
10From our sample we exclude individuals who report to have worked regular full-or part time jobs
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Description of the sample Our sample consists of 10,732 women and 8,129 mothers.
Individuals are on average between 37 and 39 years old. We construct five different age
groups, each containing about one fifth of women. Given average late birth, the first
age group contains fewer mothers. Around two thirds of women and 77% of mothers are
married and living together with their spouse. Approximately 1-2% has a nationality
different from the German one. Approximately 75% of women between 25 and 50 have
children and 10-13% are mothers of small children (age 0-2) and 14-19% have children age
3-6. The average number of children in our sample is 1.5 per woman and 2 per mother.
Among both mothers and women, around 1% have only completed primary education,
72-73% finished secondary education, and approximately 30% have completed tertiary
education.11 Around 36% of women have a regular fulltime job and 24% hold a regular
part time job. Mothers are more prone to hold part time jobs (29%) compared to fulltime
jobs (25%).12 More women live in small communities compared to medium sized or large
communities. The large majority (72-75%) of women and mothers live in West Germany.
Around 42-44% of women and mothers live in the same neighborhood or town as their
parents or in-laws and 43-44% live at least one hour away. Approximately 13-14% of
individuals live in the same house or household with parents or in-laws. Only 14% of
mothers of children younger than age three, but 84% of mothers of children between the
ages of three and six use nursery care, sitters or other types of paid child care. A little
over one third has their children cared for by relatives on a regular basis.13 The average
monthly spouse’s income is around 2800AC.14
but who also report to have worked fewer than twenty hours a month as well as those who report to
work regular full-or part time jobs but do not report their wage income or firm tenure or report zero or
negative values for any of the two variables.
11For our regression analysis we group those having completed primary and secondary education and
only differentiate between individuals with and without tertiary education.
12Note that these figures correspond to the period 1991-2006. They are thus lower compared to more
recent data because female labor force participation rates in Germany have increased significantly over
the last two decades (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005]). While in
1996, 75.7% of women and 58.5% of mothers age 25 to 54 participated in the German labor market, by
2004 these rates had increased to 77.0% and 63.1% respectively. This increase was almost exclusively
due to an increase in labor force participation rates of mothers in West Germany from 54.4% in 1996
to 61.6% in 2004. Regarding labor force participation of mothers with children under 6, those increased
from 51.4% in 1991 (OECD [2001]) to 66.3% by 2009 (OECD [2008]).
13Those two options are not exclusive. For children ages (0-2) and (3-6), 36% and 35% of mothers
who use private care also have relatives looking after their children on a regular basis, and 15% and 86%
respectively of those who use relative-provided care also use private care for their children.
14Note that when pooling the sample we only adjust wages for the change from Deutschmark to Euro.
We do not adjust for wage growth, given stagnant real hourly net wages in Germany between 2001 and
2006 (see Figure 1 in DIW [2009]).
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Table 2.1: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample-
- 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006-
Women Mothers
25-50 25-50
Age 37.4 (7.1) 38.8 (6.6)
30-34 0.20 0.18
35-39 0.22 0.24
40-44 0.21 0.25
45-50 0.20 0.23
Married, living together 0.68 0.79
Other than German nationality 0.02 0.01
Children 0.76 1
Children 0-2 0.10 0.13
Children 3-6 0.14 0.19
Number of Children 1.5(1.2) 2.0(0.9)
Primary education 0.01 0.01
Tertiary education 0.27 0.26
Regular fulltime job 0.36 0.25
Regular part time job 0.24 0.29
Small community 0.45 0.48
Large community 0.29 0.26
in East Germany 0.25 0.28
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.14 0.13
Parents or in-laws close 0.42 0.44
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 0.19 0.21
- Parents or in-laws in same town 0.23 0.24
Parents or in-laws far away 0.44 0.43
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 0.29 0.29
- Parents or in-laws further away 0.15 0.13
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 0.01 0.01
Children in non-relative care (nursery, sitter, paid care etc.)*** - 0.65
- Children (< 3) - 0.14
- Children (3− 6) - 0.84
Children cared for by relatives*** - 0.34
- Children (> 3) - 0.33
- Children (3− 6) - 0.34
Spouse’s income* 2844.5 (2362.0) 2865.0 (2159.0)
Hourly wage** 12.4 (6.2) 12.1 (6.2)
Tenure in firm** 8.4 (7.3) 8.9 (7.6)
Commuter**** 0.50 0.49
N 10,732 8,129
*** Only available for 2001 and 2006 (N = 761 for < 3, N1296 for 3 − 6.) *Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 7, 323,
N = 6, 083 for women, mothers) **Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs (N = 6, 471 ,N = 4, 348)**** Only available for 2001
and 2006 (N = 4363, N = 2913).
Hourly wages of women and mothers are around 12AC. On average, individuals have been
with their current employer for the last 8 to 9 years. Waves 2001 and 2006 of the GSOEP
also asked individuals if they worked and resided in the same town. Around 50% of indi-
viduals commute to their place of work.
Proximity to Grandparents and Relative-Provided Child Care Child care by
relatives is not only likely to influence mothers’ labor force participation decision, but at
the same time its use might be determined by mothers’ decision to work. This reversed
causality introduces a potential bias into a direct measure of grandparent-provided child
care. Using geographical proximity to grandparents as an indirect measure of grandparent-
provided child care solves this problem. However, as residence choices might not be in-
dependent of mothers’ labor force participation decisions, a caveat remains. Descriptives
statistics show that geographical proximity to grandparents and child care provided by
relatives are very much related (see Table A.1 of the Appendix A). The clear relationship
displayed in Figure 1.1 regarding child care by relatives and proximity to grandparents
hence also holds for our data set. We thus feel confident to use geographical proximity
as an indirect measure of grandparent-provided child care. Furthermore, geographical
proximity reflects more than just currently provided child care by grandparents. It might
also reflect child care provided by “potential” grandparents if living close to parents or
in-laws affects fertility decisions. Thus, geographical proximity proves particularly useful
to test effects on fertility. In addition, geographical proximity might also reflect “child
care provided in the past” if individuals continue to live close to parents or in-laws after
children have grown beyond the child care age. In this case the indirect measure can also
be used to test long-lasting effects of on wages.
Geographical proximity is only a necessary condition for grandparent-provided child care.
Other aspects such as employment status, age, or health status of grandparents may de-
termine if grandparents actually provide care for their grandchildren. Mothers of around
20% of women in our sample also participated in the GSOEP during the four waves con-
sidered. The number of observations for these mother-daughter pairs is extremely limited
and thus not suited for regression analysis. However, considering descriptive statistics
we observe that grandmothers who live close to their daughters who in turn report to
use relative-provided child care are younger, and they are also less likely to work (see
Table A.2 of the Appendix A). Surprisingly, these grandmothers also report worse health
conditions. This might be explained by the fact that grandmothers’ status of health does
not only determine if they provide child care, but caring for grandchildren may have a
negative effect on grandmothers’ health. According to Hughes et al [2011], a “ growing
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literature suggests that for many people, the net health effects of grandchild care are
negative”(p.111).
Benefits of Proximity to Grandparents and Child Care by Relatives: Fertil-
ity and Participation In line with findings in the literature discussed before, we find
geographical proximity to (“potential”) grandparents to affect fertility and labor force
participation of mothers positively. Women living in the same neighborhood or town as
their parents or in-laws have a 4 percentage points higher probability to have children
(see Table A.3 of the Appendix A). We find this positive effect to be particularly strong
for women with university education.15 Regarding participation, we find that mothers
residing close to their parents or in-laws have a 3 percentage points higher probability to
hold a regular part-or fulltime job (see Table A.5 of the Appendix A).16 This last number
is close to the lower bound of estimates of 4 percentage points for the US in Compton and
Pollak [2011]. The authors argue that geographical proximity is a good instrument for
child care arrangements because its positive effect on labor force participation does not
extend to groups for which grandparent-provided child care is not a determinant for labor
supply (men, single women without children, those with sick mothers or sick mothers-in-
law). Similarly, in our data the positive and significant effect does not extend neither to
men nor to single childless women (see Table A.6 of the Appendix A).
Costs of Grandparent-Provided Child Care: Lower wages While grandparent-
provided child care seems to promote fertility and mothers’ labor force participation, the
required geographical proximity to one’s parents or in-laws restricts one’s potential labor
market. Controlling for selection effects, we find that mothers living close to their parents
15See Table A.4 of the Appendix A for the regressions with interaction terms. Estimation results are
consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including
years of education instead of educational categories. Given that marital status and spouse’s income might
be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws we also check consistency of results, excluding both
variables.
16For our estimations regarding labor force participation we only consider a woman in the labor force
if she works a regular part-or fulltime job. All estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a
polynomial for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including years of education instead
of educational categories. Marital status and spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to
parents or in-laws. Results are robust to the exclusion of these variables. Including interaction terms of
living close to parents or in-laws and educational attainment seems to indicate that the positive effect
of living close to parents or in-laws on mothers’ labor force participation is driven by individuals with
tertiary education. However, coefficients are only (negatively) significant for individuals with primary or
secondary education.
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or in-laws earn lower hourly wages.17 The first column of Table 2.2 displays the coeffi-
cients for the Heckman selection model for log hourly wages for mothers in Germany age
25 to 50. Living close to parents or in-laws or in the same house increases the probability
Table 2.2: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.009 (0.016) -0.324*** (0.044)
Number of children -0.037*** (0.010) -0.286*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.134* (0.077) -0.312** (0.140)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.293*** (0.015) 0.441*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.049*** (0.014) 0.073** (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.050** (0.020) 0.056 (0.048)
Small community -0.040** (0.017) -0.006 (0.039)
Large community 0.046** (0.019) 0.045 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.069 (0.044) 0.294** (0.119)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.015*** (0.005)
Children 0-2 -1.114*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.905*** (0.046) 0.188** (0.087)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96, 01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 or older
living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North
Rhine-Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws. All regressions include year dummies, age group dummies and state dummies.
of holding a regular part-or fulltime job, but it reduces hourly wages by almost 5%.18
Other control variables show the expected signs. Wages are higher for those living in
larger communities, they increase with firm tenure, and tertiary education. On the other
hand, having more children, living in small communities, not being German, and living
17For this analysis, we only consider wage incomes of dependent workers of regular full-or part time
jobs.
18Using log monthly wages, controlled for by hours worked, results in slightly more negative coefficients
for living close (see Table A.7 of the Appendix A) as does not controlling for selection effects (see Table A.8
of the Appendix A for an OLS regression of log hourly wages).
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in East Germany are all aspects that affect hourly wages negatively.19 We also check if
our results are driven by low-educated individuals. Running the regression separately for
individuals with and those without tertiary education shows that this is not the case. On
the contrary, the penalty in hourly wages for staying close to parents or in-laws turns
out to be higher – more than 6% – for the group of highly educated individuals (see
Tables A.10 and A.11 of the Appendix A).
The two exclusion restrictions that we use are: (i) having a child younger than age three
and (ii) spouse’s income. Both variables affect mothers’ labor force participation (see
Table A.5 of the Appendix A). However, none is directly related to mothers’ hourly
wage rates. Given that we only consider mothers, differences in a child’s age are mostly
explained for by the mother’s own age and her years of education. We control for both of
these variables in the wage estimation. The second exclusion restriction might be invalid
if assortative matching leads to similar incomes of wife and spouse. As long as these
similarities are mostly explained for by a common level of education or the size of the
community they live in – both variables that we include as controls – the use of this
exclusion restriction is justified.
Costs of Grandparent-Provided Child Care: Commuting Costs of spatial re-
strictions may also arise from commutes. Rupert et al [2009], looking at French data find
that mothers with small children, who have a lower bargaining power as workers incur in
longer commutes. We find that for working mothers of children of age six or younger the
probability of having to commute is almost 9 percentage points higher if their children
are regularly cared for by relatives. Table 2.3 displays marginal effects from the probit
estimation for the probability of having to commute for mothers in Germany age 25 to
50.20 Having children in a nursery or with a sitter, on the other hand, does not affect
the likelihood of being a commuter. Other control variables show the expected sign. The
probability of having to commute is lower for those of nationalities other than the Ger-
man one and for individuals living in large communities in East Germany. It is higher for
mothers in small communities.21
19Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dummies
as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. Marital status and spouse’s
income might be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws. Hence, we also check the robustness
of our results to the exclusion of these variables (see Table A.9 of the Appendix A).
20We only consider waves 2001 and 2006 that include a question on commutes.
21Again results are consistent to the way the variables age and education are included. Having a child in
a nursery may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results
to the exclusion of this variable (see Table A.12 of the Appendix A). When running separate regressions
for individuals with and without tertiary education, coefficients loose significance. However, coefficients
for relative-provided child care for both groups of individuals with and without tertiary education are
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Table 2.3: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers
Married, living together 0.005 (0.055)
Number of children 0.053 (0.033)
Other than German nationality -0.278** (0.127)
Children 0-2 -0.026 (0.063)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.003 (0.011)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.127** (0.051)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives 0.087* (0.048)
Children in non-relative care -0.010 (0.072)
Small community 0.262*** (0.056)
Large community -0.213*** (0.065)
in East Germany -0.227* (0.136)
Observations 537
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 01,06; mothers 25-50 of children
<= 6 years with regular full or part time job. Reference Group: unmarried mothers of
age 25-29 in 2001 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in a medium-sized West
German town in North Rhine-Westphalia, whose children are not in nursery, nor cared
for by relatives. All regressions include dummies for age groups, states, and years.
While we find that grandparent-provided child care is related to lower wages and addi-
tional commutes for mothers, we also observe a positive relationship between grandparent-
provided child care and fertility and regular labor force participation. From these opposing
relationships a set of interesting questions arise: How valuable is grandparent-provided
child care in terms of fertility and employment? How do family policies compare to
grandparent-provided child care with respect to effects on aggregate employment and fer-
tility? There are strong interdependencies between women’s decisions regarding residence,
fertility, and labor force participation. Despite some adjustments – using proximity as
an indirect measure for child care – our empirical analysis still faces problems of endo-
geneity and reversed causality. Hence, we do not claim to have established any causal
relationships. In order to better disentangle women’s decision as well as to answer the pro-
similar (see Table A.13 of the Appendix A.
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posed questions we build a model economy that explicitly takes into account the spatial
restrictions of grandparent-provided child care. We calibrate our model to the German
economy along several key dimensions and we highlight the model’s mechanism behind
women’s decisions. These mechanisms can generate the observed relationships between
grandparent-provided child care, fertility, and labor market outcomes. Finally, we perform
two counterfactual experiments to analyze how women’s decisions change under distinct
scenarios regarding availability of grandparent-provided child care and different family
policies.
3 The Model
In our model economy there are two regions where individuals can reside, ’Home’ denoted
by ’H’ and ’Far’, denoted by ’F’. The only ex-ante difference between the two regions is
that grandparent-provided child care is only available in ’H’. The economy is populated
by a continuum of married women of mass one.22 Women in our economy live for two
periods, each of three years. Essentially we want to capture mothers’ decisions during the
time when child care is most important, i.e. during early childhood.
At the beginning of the first period, each woman receives two ’life-course offers’, one as-
sociated with living in ’H’ and the other offer associated with living in ’F’. Each offer
consists of: i) a realization of her labor productivity x and ii) an exogenous source of
income, z representing a spouse’s income, where x ∈ x1, x2, ..., xN and z ∈ z1, z2, ..., zN .
Upon observing these two offers, each woman has to decide where to reside. We assume
that residence choices are only taken once during a woman’s life time and cannot be re-
considered. Let D denote the residence choice that takes on value 1 if a woman decides
to reside in ’F.’ If she decides to reside in ’H’, D is equal to 0. Women also have to decide
whether to have children and how much to work. Women decide whether or not to have
children, k = 1 or k = 0, in the first period and children remain with their mother during
the two periods. Every period a woman has to decide how much to work. Each woman
is endowed with one unit of time. Women who have no children work all their disposable
time. Mothers too, decide how much to work, and they spend the remaining time taking
care of their children.
22In our GSOEP sample only 2.4% of single women (heads of household and not living with another
adult) are mothers, while 86% of married women who live together with their spouses are mothers.
Hence, we only model married women’s decisions. In order to keep the analysis tractable we abstain
from modeling a marriage market even though marriage and residence decisions might be related, and
we simply assign an exogenous income to each woman to represent her husband’s income.
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Working mothers with small children – from age 0 to 3 – need child care. The price
of child care, p(D) depends on the woman’s residence choice. Living in ‘H’ potentially
provides access to free child care by grandparents. However, with a certain probability
grandparents fall sick, are not alive, still work, or are otherwise unable to take care of
their grandchildren. Hence, only a share of women, p(g) living in ’H’ obtains free child
care. The remaining (1− p(g)) have to purchase child care at price p(1). All women who
live in ’F’ pay a price p(1) for child care. Women might receive a subsidy ω from the
government, thus actually paying (1−ω)p(1) for each unit of time their children spend in
child care.23 Mothers with children older than three do not pay child care, independently
of where they reside.24 Moreover, women receive family benefits T conditional on having
children.
Women care about consumption. The utility of a childless women is given by
U(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ .
Women with children (k = 1) also care about the quality of their children, e. Hence, they
enjoy the following utility
U(c, e, k) =
c1−σ
1− σ +
(
σee− σk) k,
where σk are fixed costs per child. The quality of children, e is a function of the time a
mother spends with her children, tm and the time her children spend in child care tc,
e = φmtm + φctc
Time spent in child care is assumed be equal to the time the mother is at work. A mother
spends her remaining time taking care of her children,
tc + tm = 1.
The way a mother decides to divide her time, crucially depends on how decisive her time
is for her children’s quality. This importance is captured by the two weights, φm for time
23We assume that this subsidy is only paid to women who purchase child care at price p(1), i.e. to
those living in ’F’ and those living in ’H’ who have no access to free grandparent-provided child care.
24“Germany introduced a legal entitlement for subsidized child care for children aged 3 years and up
to the mandatory school age in 1996.” pg. 35 (European Commission [2009])
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spent with the mother and φc for time spent in child care or with grandparents. We
assume time in child care and time spent with grandparents to be of equal importance
for children’s quality.25
3.1 Value functions
We solve our model backwards by first presenting the value functions for women in the
second period.
Value functions in the second period For childless women with labor productivity
x and exogenous income z, the value of residing in ’H’ is
H2(x, z) =
c1−σ
1− σ ,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(x+ z).
Childless women only care about consumption, they work all of their disposable time,
l = 1 and they consume all disposable income. The value of residing in ’F’ for a childless
woman of type x and exogenous income z is equal to the value for living in ’H’,
F 2(x, z) =
c1−σ
1− σ ,
subject to
c = (1− τ)(x+ z).
25Formal child care and grandparent-provided child might be very different. For the first nine months,
Hansen and Hawkes [2009] find that formal child care is associated with higher school readiness scores,
while grandparent-provided child care is associated with a higher vocabulary test score; both measured
at the age of three. Hence, it is not clear whether one of them is of higher quality than the other. Bernal
and Keane [2011] find that informal child care has negative effects on children’s test scores while center-
based care does not. However, the authors study single mothers only. This clearly introduces a bias
towards more disadvantaged backgrounds of mothers and as well as towards informal care providers. In
another study, Bernal [2008] finds that non-maternal child care is detrimental for children’s scores. Hence
if grandparent-provided child care is similar to the type of care a mother provides, then grandparents
might be the second best option. Moreover, children in informal care might receive more individual
attention, see Clarke-Stewart et al. [1994] and grandparents tend to guarantee a stable provider-child
relationship, something found to be determinant for the quality of child care (see Walker [1991]).
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When deciding how much to work, mothers, on the other hand take into account that
their children’s quality depends on how much time they spend taking care of them. Thus
the value function for a mother living in ’H’ during the second period is given by
H2(x, z, k) = max
l
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T,
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Women only decide to have children during the first period. Hence all children in the
second period are three years old, and they attend child care free of charge. In the
second period – for a given labor productivity type x, an exogenous income z and a fixed
number of children k – the value of living in ’H’ is equal to the value of living in ’F’.
The availability of grandparent-provided child care is not an issue anymore. The second
period value function for a mother living in ’F’ is
F 2(x, z, k) = max
l
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T,
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Value functions in the first period A woman who resides in ’H’ has to decide whether
to have children and how much to work. Only a share of working women p(g) has access
to free child care provided by grandparents. If a woman has access to free child care, her
value function is given by
H1(x, z) = max
l,k
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k + βH2(x, z, k)
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T,
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and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc.
Given that residence choices are only made at the beginning of the first period, the
continuation value for a woman living in ’H’ is equal to the discounted value of living in
’H’ in the second period.
A share (1− p(g)) of mothers who live in ’H’ and work, have to pay for child care. Their
problem is the same as that of working mothers living in ’F’.
If a woman resides in ’F’, she has to decide whether to have children and how much to
work, taking into account that if she has children and works, she has to purchase child care
at price p(1) for each unit of time she works, l. Child care services might be subsidized
at a rate ω. The value of living in ’F’ – as well as the value of living close but not having
access to free child care – for a woman in the first period is given by
F 1(x, z) = max
l,k
(
c1−σ
1− σ + (σ
ee− σk)k + βF 2(x, z, k))
subject to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ)(xl + z) + T − (1− ω)p(1)l
and given the children’s quality production function
e = φmtm + φctc
.
Residence Decisions When deciding where to reside, women do not know for sure if
they will have access to free grandparent-provided child care if they choose to reside at
’H’. Thus they have to calculate the expected value of living in ’H’ which is given by
EH1∗ = p(g)H1∗(x, z) + (1− p(g))F 1∗(x, z)),
where F 1∗(x, z) and H1∗(x, z) denote the value functions evaluated at the optimal deci-
sions of labor supply and number of children.
Women decide where to reside by comparing the expected value of living in ’H’ to the
value of living in ’F’. They will decide to live in ’F’ if and only if the expected value of
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living in ’H’ is strictly higher than the value of living in ’F’.26 Thus,
D = 1 iff EH1∗(x, z) < F 1∗(x, z)
else
D = 0
If child care were free in both regions there would only be two reasons why women would
decide to reside in ’F’: (i) a higher labor productivity in ’F’ and/or (ii) a higher exogenous
income in ’F’. However, once child care is costly women’s residence choices depend on the
life-course offers for each of the two regions, the price of child care in ’F’ and the availability
of free child care in ’H’. A woman who receives the same life-course offer in both regions–
the same productivity x and the same exogenous income z – will always decide to live
in ’H’ because this is where she may enjoy access to free child care. However, life-course
offers can differ. Assume that a woman receives an offer (x, z)H associated with living
in ’H’ and an offer (x, z)F associated with living in ’F’. Her offer could include a higher
productivity in ’F’, (xF > xH) , a lower productivity in ’F’ , (xF < xH) or productivities
could be the same, (xF = xH). Moreover, exogenous incomes might also be different. In
this case, residence choices become non-trivial. A higher offer might not be enough to
compensate for the cost of child care and a woman might decide to reside in ’H’ even
if the life-course offer in ’F’ is higher. In the following subsection we analyze the closed
form solution for labor supply in our model and we discuss how changes in the price of
child care and life-course offers affect women’s labor supply decision.
3.2 Labor Supply
For our relatively simple model of grandparent-provided child care and women’s labor
market outcomes, we are able to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal labor
supply. Childless women work all their disposable time, l∗ = 1. For mothers on the
other hand, the optimal labor supply is a function of: the price of child care, the labor
productivity, and the exogenous income. Mothers’ optimal labor supply is given by
l∗ =
1
σe(φm − φc))
1
σ (x(1− τ)− (1− ω)p(1)) 1−σσ − (1− τ)z + T
(1− τ)x− (1− ω)p(1) ,
subject to
0 ≤ l∗ ≤ 1.
26We assume those indifferent to move to ’F’. If instead we assumed that they would move to ’H’,
results would not change, with the exception of results on mobility.
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Mothers’ optimal labor supply depends crucially on how important time spent with their
mother is for children’s quality, compared to the time spent in child care or with grandpar-
ents. We assume that the importance of time with their mothers is at least as important
as time in child care (φm ≥ φc). Mothers’ labor supply also depends on the relationship
between mothers’ labor productivity and the cost of child care, as well as on the rela-
tive value of the exogenous income with respect to labor productivity. Women whose
marginal benefit from working – their labor productivity x – is lower than the marginal
cost of working – the cost of child care, p(1) – will decide to stay home. On the other
hand, if the importance of mothers’ time for children’s quality were the same as the im-
portance of time spent in child care, φm = φc women whose labor productivity is high
enough would work all their disposable time
l∗ =
{
0 for (1− τ)x < (1− ω)p(1) and φm ≥ φc
1 for (1− τ)x > (1− ω)p(1) and φm = φc.
In case φm > φc, women whose labor productivity suffices to pay for child care will work,
0 < l∗ ≤ 1 . Even though, a mother’s time has a higher weight for children’s quality,
working increases disposable income and consequently consumption. The effect of other
parameters on the optimal labor supply is as expected. A higher weight of consumption
for utility(σ), increases labor supply. An increase in the importance of time spent in
child care for children’s quality and an increase in labor productivity have similar effects.
On the other hand, an increase in the weight of a mother’s time for children’s quality
reduces labor supply. Similarly an increase in the cost of child care and an increase in the
exogenous income decrease labor supply.
4 Calibration Strategy
In order to be able to quantify the importance of grandparent-provided child care and the
effect of family policies for women’s decisions on residence choice, labor supply, and fer-
tility, we calibrate our model. Some parameters of the model are fixed based on available
evidence. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the model to several labor
market statistics and fertility data from Germany. Most statistics used for calibration
come from pooled waves 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006 of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). We consider weighted statistics for married women in West Germany ages 20
to 48 for whom information on parents’ residence is available.27 Finally, we set policy
27Note that we join dummy variables “parents or in-laws in same house” and “parents or in-laws close.”
We chose ages 20 to 48 because this is the widest range for women with children ages 0-6. We only consider
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parameters to represent German family policies.
4.1 Parameters
In our model economy, individuals are distributed over different life-course offers. This
distribution is denoted by Π(xh, zh, xf , zf ), chosen such as to be consistent with the ex-
istence of an initial distribution of young women over labor productivities, Ω(x) and an
initial distribution of men over labor productivities, Θ(z). Hence Ω(xi) denotes the mass
of women who are of productivity type xi, for i = 1...N . Labor productivities x and z
follow a log normal distribution.
We discretize the distribution of men’s observed wages to obtain twenty different types of
exogenous incomes. Mean and standard deviation of men’s productivity distribution are
denoted by µz and σz. The distribution of women’s observed wages, on the other hand,
is likely to be effected by selection into employment. Thus we assume the standard devi-
ation of men and women’s wages to be the same and we calibrate the mean of women’s
underlying productivity distribution to match the observed mean wage for women. Es-
timates for these parameters (µz, σz, σx) and calibration targets (µx) are taken from the
distribution of hourly wage rates observed in our GSOEP sample. They are µz = 2.74
and σz = 0.41 for men and µx = 2.46 and σx = σz = 0.41 for women.
A life-course offer is a labor productivity and an exogenous income. It can be interpreted
as a couple formed by a woman of productivity, x and a man of income z. Thus, the
probability of an offer is equivalent to a matching probability between a woman and a
man. The probability that an offer (xi, zj)
d for d = H,F is realized, or that a woman
of type xi matches with a man of type zj is denoted by Φ(x, z). If a man and a woman
are of the same type, i = j, this probability is equal to ψ. Otherwise the probability is
given by 1−ψ
N−1 for i ∈ 1, ..., N and j ∈ 1, ..., N . To assign a value to ψ, we use the degree
of assortative matching indicating how likely it is to meet your own productivity type.
Ferna´ndez et al. [2005] estimate this value to be 0.7 for Germany, i.e. 70% of women in
Germany match with men of the same type. The remaining 30% are equally likely to
match with men of types different from their own.
In order to determine the distribution of life-course offers, Π[(x, z)H , (x, z)F ], we need to
individuals who provide information on if they have children, and if and how they participate in the labor
market.
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know how many individuals receive an offer (xi, zj)
H in ’H’ and an offer (xr, zp)
F in ’F’,
for i, j, r, p ∈ 1, ..., N . For instance, how many women receive a particular offer (x1, z3)H
in ’H’ and an offer (x3, z5)
F in ’F’? The number of individuals receiving the offer (x1, z3)
H
depends on the number of individuals of type x1 – given by Ω(x1) – and on the number of
individuals of type z3, – given by Θ(z3) – and on the probability of this match happening,
Φ(x1, z3). Thus the number of women receiving an offer (x1, z3)
H is equal to the product
of the three elements, Ω(x1)Θ(z3)Φ(x1, z3). It is thus equal to the probability of a woman
being of type x1 and the probability of a man with income z3 and the probability for
this match to happen. Likewise, the number of individuals receiving an offer (x3, z5)
F is
given by Ω(x3)Θ(z5)Φ(x3, z5). Hence the number of individuals receiving the two offers
detailed above is equal to the probability of individuals receiving an offer (x1, z3)
H times
the probability of individuals receiving an offer (x3, z5)
F , normalized by the probability of
receiving any offer. Given that there is a mass one of individuals, the number of individ-
uals of a certain type is given by the probability of being an individual of that type. Each
of the elements of Π[(x, z)h, (x, z)f ] are calculated in the same fashion. The distribution
of life-course offers is key to our analysis, as it determines how individuals are distributed
across different offers, which will have implications for the model’s aggregate statistics.
According to SHARE around 16.8% of German grandparents who live close to their adult
children who have children age three or younger take care of these grandchildren on a
daily basis. Mothers of around 89% of women in our GSOEP sample are still alive. Hence
we assign value 0.14 to the parameter p(g) that denotes the share of women who live in
’H’ and who have access to grandparent-provided child care. Given that one model period
is equivalent to 3 years, the discount factor, β is set to a value of 0.957 in order to match
a yearly interest rate of 4%. Table 4.4 displays all parameters set a priori.
Table 4.4: Parameters based on a priori information
Parameter Explanation Value
σx standard deviation of women’s log productivity 0.41
µz mean log productivity of spouses 2.74
σz standard deviation of spouses’ log productivity 0.41
p(g) % of women with access to free care in ’H’ 0.14
ψ assortative matching parameter 0.7
β discount factor 0.957
We calibrate the parameters of the utility function, (σ, σe, σk), the hourly cost of child
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care, p(1), women’s mean log hourly wage rate µx, as well as the parameters of the chil-
dren’s quality function, (φm, φc). Note that we impose φm + φc = 1, and hence we only
need to calibrate one of the two parameters. We now relate the calibrated parameters to
the data moments that they are most likely to affect.
We set the mean of the distribution of women’s underlying productivities x¯ to 2.1 in
order to match women’s observed mean log hourly wage rate, µx of 2.46. The weight of
consumption in the utility function, σ is set to 0.986, to match the percentage of working
women in ’H’.28 These women face lower child care costs on average and their participa-
tion decision is crucially determined by the value of consumption. We use two moments
related to fertility and participation to match the cost of children in the utility function,
σk and the weight of children’s quality, σe. The weight of children’s quality in the utility
function affects the decision of whether to participate in the labor market or not. Thus,
to match this parameters we use the participation rates of mothers with older children
(ages 3 − 6) who live in ’H’ and who face no child care costs. Whether a woman wants
to become a mother or not is related to the fixed cost of children. Hence we choose the
percentage of women who are mothers in ’H’ to match the fixed cost σk. We set σk and
σe to 0.33 and 1.14 respectively.
The weight of mother’s time for children’s quality, φm determines how much a mother
works depending on her children’s age. We calibrate this parameter to match the per-
centage of mothers in ’H’ who work while having small children (0-2). This parameter
takes the value 0.672. For the cost of child care p(1), the OECD [2008] estimates that
child care costs in Germany amount to 9.1% of average income. Thus we set p(1) to 1 to
match this number.29 Table 4.5 displays the calibrated parameters of the model.
Finally, the model’s policy parameters are the income tax rate, τ , child care subsidies,
and family benefits, i.e. ω, T . All working individuals pay a proportional tax, τ on
labor income (exogenous income and wage rate). We set τ to 37% which is equivalent
to the income tax revenue collected by the German government as a fraction of GDP
(OECD [2010]). According to the OECD [2009], all German families receive some family
benefits for each child up to the age of eighteen (Kindergeld). In particular, they re-
28In the data those who live in ’H’ are those who live in the same house, neighborhood, or town as
their parents or inlaws.
29Note that men and women in our model who are not taking care of their children work all their
disposable time. Given that we targeted hourly wage rates, the resulting average income in the model is
too high compared to the data. In order to calculate child care costs as a fraction of average income we
impose a maximum working time, 40% of disposable time, i.e. 40 hours per week of 98 hours disposable
time after subtracting 10 hours per day for sleeping, eating, personal care.
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Table 4.5: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
x¯ mean underlying productivity of women 2.1
σ weight of consumption 0.986
σe weight of children quality 1.14
σk fixed cost of children 0.33
φm weight of mother’s time 0.672
p(1) cost of child care 1
ceive 184 Euros per month for the first child, 190 for the second and 205 for the third,
fourth, fifth child etc. We set the amount of family benefits in our economy, T such as to
match that for the average German family (in terms of income and number of children),
Kindergeld is equivalent to around 5% of family income. Hence, T is set to 0.522. Ac-
cording to the same source, child care subsidies for small children (0-3) are negligible in
Germany. Therefore, we set child care subsidies (ω) to zero. All policy parameters are
displayed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Policy Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
τ income tax 0.37
T Family Benefits 0.522
ω child care subsidy 0
5 Results-Benchmark Economy
In Table 5.7 we present model moments of our benchmark economy together with the
corresponding data moments. We use data moments from our GSOEP sample along
several dimensions relevant to the analysis of women’s fertility behavior and labor force
participation.
Our model does particularly well in matching the labor force participation rate of moth-
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Table 5.7: Data and Model Moments
Data Model
% of women being mothers, ’H’ 72.34 68.04
LFP rate of women, ’H’ 50.36 68.22
LFP rate of mothers, children [0-3), ’H’ 26.75 27.91
LFP rate of mothers, children [3-6), ’H’ 46.22 79.10
Child care costs as % of average income 9.10 10.5
Mean working women log hourly wage rate 2.46 2.48
ers with small children [0-3) who live close to parents or in-laws. This rate is equal to
26.75% in the data while the model estimates it to be 27.91%. In Germany, the cost of
child care is equal to 9.10% of average income. The model also matches child care costs
relatively well. We also match the mean log hourly wage rate observed in the data for
working women. Our model somewhat under-predicts the percentage of women who are
mothers. On the other hand, the model clearly overestimates labor force participation
rates of mothers with children between the ages of 3 and 6 who live in ’H’. While in
the data this rate is 46.22% the model estimates a rate of 79.10%. This is the reason
why the model has difficulties matching aggregate labor force participation rates in ’H’.
The percentage of women who live close to parents or in-laws and work is 50.36 in the
data while in the model this number is 68.22. Given our model set-up matching both the
participation rate of mothers with small children and the overall participation rate is not
possible. In our model, mothers with children ages 3 to 6 do not face any child care costs.
This is a simplification, because while availability of child care is almost guaranteed for
these children, child care is not free. We could introduce a cost of child care in the second
period in order to match this statistic better but we consider that the focus of this paper
is on the period of early childhood when child care is most costly. We believe that we
would not gain important additional insights by adjusting the model to better match this
statistic. Hence, while our model misses an additional channel that determines why some
mothers do not work, it does replicates well the fact that more mothers work as their
children become older.
The model performs better along some dimensions than others. However, model moments
in Table 5.7 were targeted explicitly to calibrate certain parameters. In order to assess
the model’s validity for carrying out policy analysis, we need to consider the model’s
performance in matching moments that have not been used for calibration. To this end we
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consider the following statistics. Table 5.8 shows these un-targeted moments of the model
and the corresponding data moments. In our model, individuals do not value leisure and
hence when a mother is not working, she is taking care of her children. Hence, time spent
taking care of children is a residual in our model. Despite the lack of leisure, the model
does quite well in matching time spent with children. According to the OECD [2008],
women spend 14 per cent of their time taking care of their children, while in our model
this number is 11%. Furthermore, the model predicts that 52 per cent of women live
in ’H’, while in the data, 43 per cent of women live close to parents or in-laws. While
the model somewhat overestimates this statistic, taking into account that we did not
target this number in the calibration the model does fairly well. As expected our model
overestimates the aggregate labor force participation of married women.
Table 5.8: Data and Model Moments: Not used for calibration
Data Model
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 66.75 64.05
Aggregate LFP rate of women 48.90 67.40
LFP rate of women, ’F’ 47.62 66.51
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 20.55 20.30
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’F’ 44.10 75.08
Average time spent with child, as % of total time 14.9 11.15
% of women being mothers, far 66.75 6402
share of female married population living in ’H’ 43.43 52
6 Discussion
6.1 Cost in terms of wages
In the empirical analysis of the paper we showed that there exists a negative relationship
for mothers between living close to parents or in-laws and hourly wages. In our model,
where women’s residence is a choice and depends on life-course offers received and on
child care costs the same relationship arises. Figure 6.2 shows the wage distributions of
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working mothers in both regions.30 We obverse that the mean of the wage distribution in
’F’ (15.52) is higher than in ’H’ (13.79). The model thus generates endogenous differences
in wage rates of working mothers. In our model it is differences in child care costs that
generate these differences in wage rates. In ’F’, there is no access to free grandparent-
provided child care, and women who work have to pay for child care. This leads to a
selection of high productivity type working women into residing in ’F’.
Figure 6.2: Working Mothers’ Wage Distribution
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In our empirical analysis, we used a Heckman selection model to control for the fact that
observed wages might be biased upward by a selection of women into employment. How-
ever, we were not able to control for a selection into residing close or far from parents
or in-laws. In the model on the other hand, we are able to also control for this addi-
tional selection effect. Figure 6.3 displays the underlying or potential wage distributions
of mothers in both regions, before employment decisions. Women reside in ’F’ to take
30We generate a fat tail at the far end of the distribution. This is due to the modeling choice that
individuals receive with positive probability an offer that includes the highest productivity type. We could
eliminate this kink by introducing an additional parameter but we believe that this does not change our
results and that it is not central to the question we analyze.
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advantage of higher wages. To analyze whether those who reside in ’H’ despite lower av-
erage wages do so because of grandparent-provided child care, we consider the underlying
wage distributions in both regions when there are no grandparents. When this is the case
- and due to our assumption that individuals who are indifferent move to ’F’ - we observe
more high productivity type women in ’H’.31 In addition to the effect of selection into
employment, residence choices also contribute to the differences in the wage distributions
of women in ’H’ and in ’F’. While these differences are small they clearly vary according
to the availability of grandparent-provided child care.
Figure 6.3: Women’s Wage Distribution
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In the model, women decide where to reside, based on the life-course offers they receive
and taking into account the higher costs of child care faced in ’F’. Life-course offers consist
of different wages and different exogenous incomes in both regions.32 In order to better
31If we were to distribute those indifferent equally among ’H’ and ’F’, distribution would be equal
across the two regions.
32See the seminal paper by Mincer [1978] for determinants of family migration decisions. The author
finds husbands’ wage offers to be determinant, but to a lesser extent if wives are working and if their work
is permanent and well paid. Hence, both husbands’ and wives’ wages determine migration decisions.
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analyze the role of life-course offers for women’s decisions, we consider life-course offers
that only differ in one of the two dimensions. First we analyze the role of women’s wages
by only allowing offers to differ across the woman’s wage in each region. In this case, a
life-course offer consists of a pair of wage and exogenous income in ’H’ and a different
wage and the same exogenous income in ’F’. In a second step we maintain wage offers
fixed and only vary exogenous incomes across regions.
6.2 Effect of women’s wages on decisions
To study the importance of women’s wages for residence choices, we shut down the ex-
ogenous income channel. Therefore, women receive the same exogenous income in both
’H’ and ’F’. In this case, the only reason to move to ’F’ is a higher wage rate and the
wage distribution of women who live in ’F’ is skewed to the right (see Figure 6.4). The
distribution of exogenous incomes in ’F’, on the other hand is symmetric. Only 22 % of
women live in ’F’ compared to 48 % in the benchmark economy. Without any variation
in exogenous income 58% fewer women live in ’F’.
Figure 6.4: Women’s Wage Distribution and Women’s Exogenous income distribution
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Given restrictions on possible exogenous incomes, on the aggregate women receive lower
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exogenous incomes and they thus participate more. In particular, in ’F’ 65 % of mothers
with small children participate. These women can afford to pay for child care but would
decide not to work if they had higher exogenous incomes.
6.3 Effect of exogenous income on decisions
If now we assume that women receive the same productivity type offer in both regions,
we observe that the distribution of productivity types in ’F’ displays a larger variance
than the distribution in ’H’. On the other hand, the distribution of exogenous incomes in
’F’ is skewed to the right (see Figure 6.5). The main reason for moving to ’F’ now lies in
a higher exogenous income and we thus observe women with relatively higher exogenous
income in ’F’. Again, the share of women living in ’F’ is lower than in the benchmark,
21% versus 48%, i.e. 60 per cent fewer women live in ’F’. We also observe a decrease in
female labor force participation as women face lower wages on average.
Figure 6.5: Women’s Wage Distribution and Women’s Exogenous income distribution
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Thus both channels - women’s own wages and their spouses’ wages - are important when
understanding women’s residence choices as well as decisions regarding labor force par-
ticipation. If we were to shut down both channels, by assumption only those individuals
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who are indifferent would live in ’F’. Hence, the majority of women (99%) would live in
’H’.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
In our first counterfactual experiment we analyze a situation where grandparents are not
available to take care of their grandchildren and everyone has to pay for child care. Our
second counterfactual experiment considers an increase in subsidies for paid child care.
The purpose of our first experiment is to quantify the importance of grandparent-provided
child care. There are several reasons why the provision of child care by grandparents might
be reduced in the future. Women’s age at first child birth has been increasing over the
last decades. In 2009, German mothers were on average 30 years old when giving birth
to their first child, while in 1970 average age at first birth was 24 (OECD [2008]). As
successive generations of women delay birth, grandparents may be to be too old or too
sick to take of their grandchildren. On the other hand, women’s labor force participation
and individuals’ retirement age has been and is increasing in many countries. Situations
where both generations of women – grandmothers and adult daughters – are of working
age when grandchildren come along are going to be even more likely in the future.33 Re-
garding our second experiment, we consider a subsidy for child care. Given the positive
relationship found in the literature between availability and low cost of child care and
female labor force participation, we would expect such a policy to lead to an increase in
mothers’ labor force participation. We set the subsidy to 53 per cent of child care costs.
This is the amount of subsidy needed to reduce the cost of child care in our benchmark
model such as to be equal to the cost that families in Sweden face. In Sweden, child care
costs are among the lowest compared to other OECD countries, and they amount to 4.6
per cent of average income (OECD [2008]).
No grandparent-provided child care Table 7.9 provides moments from our first
counterfactual experiment when there is no grandparent-provided child care available, to-
gether with the corresponding moments from our benchmark economy. In the benchmark
economy, women in ’F’ and a share of (1 − p(g)) of women in ’H’ face high child care
costs. Without the availability of grandparents, the incentive to remain close disappears.
We thus observe that the share of women living in ’F’ is 4 percentage points higher than
33Individuals’ increasing life expectancy and better health might counteract the problem of late first
child birth. However, this increased life expectancy is again likely to lead to successive increases in
retirement age.
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Table 7.9: No Grandparent-provided child care
No Benchmark
grandparents economy
Aggregate LFP rate of women 66.17 67.40
% of women being mothers, ’H’ 64.25 68.04
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 65.67 64.05
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’H’ 20.42 27.91
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’H’ 75.37 78.67
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 18.28 20.30
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’F’ 77.70 75.08
share of women living in ’H’ 47.73 52.35
in the benchmark economy. We also observe that labor force participation of mothers
with older children (3− 6) who do not face child care costs increases slightly for those in
’F’. But it decreases for those in ’H’. Meanwhile labor force participation of mothers with
small children decreases in both regions. This result is due to a composition effect. More
women decide to live in ’F’ as free child care in ’H’ ceases to exist. In the first period,
women in ’F’ will be constrained and might decide not to work, but in the second period
when children are older these women will be able to work for a higher wage. This leads
to lower participation when children are small and more participation when children are
older. For mothers who live in ’H’, we observe that only those women who can afford
to pay for child care work. Thus participation in ’H’ falls in both periods. Labor force
participation of women in ’H’ drops by 7 percentage points in the first period. On the ag-
gregate, labor force participation by women drops by 1 percentage point compared to our
benchmark economy. Finally, we observe a one percentage point reduction in the number
of women who become mothers. Women who would decide to reside in ’H’ if there was
grandparent-provided child care, react by moving more, participating less, and having
fewer children. However, given that in our benchmark economy only 14% of grandparents
are readily available for child care, effects of a loss in availability of grandparents are small
on the aggregate.
Child Care Subsidies In our second counterfactual experiment we consider an increase
in child care subsidies. In particular, we consider a policy that subsidizes 53% of child care
costs, i.e. the policy parameter ω is set to 0.53. Table 7.10 displays moments from this
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counterfactual experiment, next to moments from our benchmark economy, with ω = 0.
Under this policy, every woman can afford to become a mother and around 84 per cent of
women work. A child care subsidy not only affects women who live in ’F’, but also those
who live in ’H’ and who do not have access to grandparent-provided child care. Thus,
subsidizing child care increases labor force participation of mothers living in ’H’ as well as
of mothers in ’F’. A share of p(g) of women still has access to free grandparent-provided
child care, which leads to a slightly higher participation of mothers in ’H’ compared to ’F’.
It is for the same reason that we do not observe any change in the share of women living
in ’F’. The significant increases in both the aggregate number of mothers and mothers’
labor force participation rates, indicate that subsidizing child care costs can lead to higher
fertility and participation.
Table 7.10: Child care subsidized, ω = 0.53
Benchmark
ω = 0.53 economy
Aggregate LFP rate of women 83.85 67.40
% of women being mothers, ’H’ 100 68.04
% of women being mothers, ’F’ 100 64.05
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’H’ 83.45 27.91
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’H’ 85.41 78.67
LFP rate of mothers children [0-3), ’F’ 82.15 20.30
LFP rate of mothers children [3-6), ’F’ 84.15 75.08
share of women living in ’H’ 52.35 52.35
8 Conclusion
In this paper we document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking
at German data we find that women residing close to parents or in-laws are more likely to
have children and that as mothers they are more likely to hold a regular full-or part time
job. However, we find that their wages are lower and that they are more likely to incur
in commutes. We build a simple model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female
labor force participation to account for this trade-off. We simulate the model to match
the German economy in terms of fertility and female labor force participation. We then
perform two counterfactual experiments to analyze how women’s decisions on residence,
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fertility, and labor force participation change under distinct scenarios regarding availabil-
ity of grandparent-provided child care and different family policies. We find that if there
was no grandparent-provided child care, fewer women would participate in the labor mar-
ket and fewer would become mothers. We also observe that mobility increases. Hence,
grandparent-provided child care imposes a geographical restriction on women. One way
to remove this restriction would be to subsidize child care. However, we find no effect
on mobility when we subsidize 53% of child care costs. However, this subsidy leads to
increases in both, aggregate female labor force participation and fertility.
In absence of child care subsidies, grandparent-provided child care plays an important role
for mothers’ labor force participation. However, grandparent-provided child care imposes
spatial restrictions that limit labor mobility. Women who remain close to their parents
or in-laws have access to a confined labor market, which might imply worse labor market
opportunities and thus lower wages. Hence, when designing policies aimed at increasing la-
bor force participation of mothers, policy makers should take into account the wide-spread
presence of grandparent-provided child care as well as the spatial restrictions it implies.
For instance, a policy that subsidizes grandparents’ time may not only affect mothers’
labor force participation but it may also have an impact on their wages and/or commutes.
In this paper we simply assume that being close to one’s grandparents’ implies that with a
certain probability grandparents take care of their grandchildren, and we did not consider
grandparents’ decisions to provide or not child care. However, this decision might be
very related to individuals’ retirement age and especially in the case of grandmothers to
previous decisions about labor force participation. In this sense, opposing forces for cohort
effects of female labor force participation could arise. On the one hand, having a working
mother increases the likelihood for her daughters to also become working mothers.34 On
the other hand, a grandmother who is actively participating in the labor market might
be less likely to provide child care for her grandchild, something that is found to increase
mother’s labor force participation rates. We believe that a very interesting road for future
research could be an analysis of how late first birth and improved health after retirement
interact with these counteracting force.
34See Fernandez et al [2004] and Farre and Vella [2007] on the intergenerational transmission of attitude
towards the role of women in the economy and its effect on female labor force participation.
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A Appendix
Figure A-1: Grandparent-Provided Care for Grandchildren, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-2: Frequency of Care for and Distance to Grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Figure A-3: Frequency of Care for and Distance to Grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-4: Frequency of Care for and Distance to Grandchild, ≤ 6
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Table A.1: Use of Relative-Provided Child Care by Proximity to Parents or In-laws
(Number of Observations )
Mothers with Working Mothers with Mothers with Working Mothers with
children <= 6 children <= 6 children < 3 children < 3
All 34.9% (n = 2148) 44.4% (n = 786) 33.3% (n = 901) 46.6% (n = 176)
Parents or in-laws in same house 49.8% (n = 265) 64.6% (n = 99) 48.6% (n = 111) 77.8% (n = 18)
Parents or in-laws close 45.1% (n = 990) 53.8% (n = 379) 43.7% (n = 398) 57.6% (n = 85)
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 50.7% (n = 489) 56.8% (n = 190) 49.5% (n = 204) 60.5% (n = 43)
- Parents or in-laws in same town 39.5% (n = 501) 50.8% (n = 189) 37.6% (n = 194) 54.8% (n = 42)
Parents or in-laws far away 19.1% (n = 893) 26.3% (n = 308) 18.4% (n = 392) 26.0% (n = 73)
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 24.7% (n = 635) 32.1% (n = 224) 24.6% (n = 280) 32.7% (n = 52)
- Parents or in-laws further away 5.4% (n = 241) 11.3% (n = 80) 2.8% (n = 107) 10.0%(n = 20)
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 5.9% (n = 17) 0 (n = 4) 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 1)
Women 25-50, pooled waves 2001 and 2006.
Table A.2: Use of Relative-Provided Child Care, Age, Health Status and Labor Force
Participation of Grandmothers (Number of Observations )
All Close to own parents and using relative-provided care
Mothers with Working Mothers with Mothers with Working Mothers with
children <= 6 children <= 6 children <= 6 children <= 6
Age grandmother 58.0 (7.8) (n = 503) 57.9 (7.7)(n = 151) 57.3 (7.7)(n = 81) 55.4(7.4) (n = 33)
Grandmother not employed 51.5% (n = 410) 45.2% (n = 126) 64.2% (n = 67) 61.5% (n = 26)
Grandmother works full time 25.8% (n = 410) 32.5% (n = 126) 17.9% (n = 67) 30.8% (n = 26)
Grandmother works part time 18.0% (n = 410) 15.9% (n = 126) 13.4% (n = 67) 7.7% (n = 26)
Grandmother very good or good health 30.2% (n = 410) 21.4% (n = 126) 28.4% (n = 67) 26.9% (n = 26)
Grandmother not good or bad health 23.7%(n = 410) 23.0%(n = 126) 28.4% (n = 67) 26.9% (n = 26)
Women 25-50, pooled waves 2001 and 2006.
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Table A.3: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
Married, living together 0.286*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.008 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.177*** (0.023)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.041*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.002 (0.013)
Small community 0.036*** (0.011)
Large community -0.065*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06;
Women 25-50. Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried women age 25-29, with education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4),
living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991, in a medium-sized
town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.4: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
with Interaction Terms
Married, living together 0.286*** (0.012) 0.286*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.008 (0.027) 0.008 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.178*** (0.023) 0.178*** (0.023)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.102*** (0.013)
Primary/Secondary edu (ISCED: 0-4) 0.102*** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws close 0.032*** (0.010) 0.064*** (0.016)
Parents in-laws close*Tert edu 0.031* (0.017)
Parents in-laws close*Non-Tert edu -0.033* (0.020)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Small community 0.036*** (0.011) 0.036*** (0.011)
Large community -0.065*** (0.012) -0.065*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies. Reference group:
unmarried women age 25-29 with education level 3 (ISCED 5,6) and education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4) respectively
living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.5: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers’ Labor Force
Participation
Regular Part or
Fulltime Job
Number of children -0.114*** (0.007)
Children 0-2 -0.398*** (0.016)
Married, living together -0.128*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.123** (0.054)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.006*** (0.002)
in East Germany 0.116** (0.046)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.171*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws close 0.029** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.022 (0.019)
Small community -0.003 (0.015)
Large community 0.018 (0.017)
Observations 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried
mothers age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2(ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West
Germany North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents or in-laws, with children age 3 or older.
Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies.
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Table A.6: Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Labor Force Participation of (1)
Men and (2) Single Childless Women
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Married, living together 0.106*** (0.008)
Other than German nationality -0.096*** (0.032) -0.097 (0.071)
in East Germany -0.067** (0.027) -0.299** (0.136)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.088*** (0.006) 0.135*** (0.024)
Parents or in-laws close 0.009 (0.007) 0.033 (0.028)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.008 (0.010) -0.100*** (0.037)
Small community 0.003 (0.009) -0.034 (0.036)
Large community -0.013 (0.010) -0.125*** (0.033)
Observations 8,653 1,176
1) Men 25-50. Reference group: unmarried men age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a
medium-sized town in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws 2) single childless
women (25-50). Reference group: women age 25-29 in 1991, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in a medium-
sized town in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies.
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Table A.7: Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Monthly Wages
Log monthly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.035** (0.017) -0.326*** (0.044)
Number of children -0.047*** (0.010) -0.287*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.116 (0.083) -0.311** (0.140)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.282*** (0.016) 0.441*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.056*** (0.015) 0.073** (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.059*** (0.022) 0.056 (0.048)
Small community -0.038** (0.018) -0.007 (0.039)
Large community 0.053*** (0.020) 0.046 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.081* (0.042) 0.296*** (0.119)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.016*** (0.005)
Children 0-2 -1.105*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Monthly hours worked 0.007*** (0.000)
Constant 5.787*** (0.055) 0.186** (0.087)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 or older with
education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from
parents or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
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Table A.8: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of OLS Estimation of Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Married, living together 0.000 (0.015)
Number of children -0.026*** (0.008)
Other than German nationality -0.121 (0.077)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.280*** (0.014)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Parents or in-laws close -0.052*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.052** (0.020)
Small community -0.040** (0.017)
Large community 0.045** (0.019)
in East Germany -0.081* (0.044)
Constant 1.955*** (0.041)
Observations 4,348
R-squared 0.262
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS Estimation; Data:
GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with full-or part time regular job.
Regression includes age group, state, and year dummies. Reference group: unmarried
mothers age 25-29 living in West Germany in North Rhine-Westphalia , with education
level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.9: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages without
Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Marital Status and Income of Spouse
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Number of children -0.038*** (0.010) -0.292*** (0.017)
Other than German nationality -0.135* (0.077) -0.340** (0.139)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.293*** (0.015) 0.433*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.049*** (0.014) 0.061* (0.033)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.051** (0.020) 0.037 (0.047)
Small community -0.040** (0.016) -0.014 (0.038)
Large community 0.046** (0.019) 0.056 (0.044)
in East Germany -0.067 (0.044) 0.314*** (0.119)
Children 0-2 -1.117*** (0.056)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.897*** (0.047) 0.061 (0.083)
Observations 8,129 8,129
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3 and older living in West Germany, with
education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents
or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
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Table A.10: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for Low Educated Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.002 (0.019) -0.341*** (0.051)
Other than German nationality -0.207** (0.090) -0.435*** (0.155)
Number of children -0.038*** (0.012) -0.290*** (0.020)
Parents or in-laws close -0.042** (0.017) 0.059 (0.038)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.038 (0.024) 0.035 (0.054)
Small community -0.043** (0.020) -0.013 (0.044)
Large community 0.042* (0.022) 0.048 (0.050)
in East Germany -0.135*** (0.048) 0.477*** (0.117)
Children 0-2 -1.102*** (0.070)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.018*** (0.006)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Constant 1.895*** (0.055) 0.190* (0.097)
Observations 6,035 6,035
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with primary pr secondary education. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children age 3
and older living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town
in North Rhine-Westphalia , far from parents or in-laws. Regressions include dummies for age groups, states and years.
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Table A.11: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckman Selection Model for High Educated Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.015 (0.028) -0.286*** (0.095)
Number of children -0.026 (0.016) -0.265*** (0.038)
Other than German nationality 0.089 (0.148) 0.220 (0.353)
Parents or in-laws close -0.066*** (0.024) 0.090 (0.068)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.069* (0.038) 0.159 (0.107)
Small community -0.038 (0.030) -0.029 (0.084)
Large community 0.047 (0.033) 0.042 (0.091)
in East Germany -0.146** (0.064) 0.307* (0.174)
Children 0-2 -1.095*** (0.098)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.007 (0.011)
Tenure in firm 0.013*** (0.002)
Constant 2.266*** (0.088) 0.679*** (0.208)
Observations 2,094 2,094
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50, with tertiary education. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 with children age 3 and older living
in West Germany, with education level 3 (ISCED: 5-6) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town in North Rhine-
Westphalia, far from parents or in-laws. Regressions include age group, state, and year dummies.
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Table A.12: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers without variable
posing a possible endogeneity problem: Children in non-relative care
Commuter
Married, living together 0.006 (0.055)
Number of children 0.053 (0.033)
Other than German nationality -0.278** (0.127)
Children 0-2 -0.024 (0.060)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.003 (0.011)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.126** (0.051)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives 0.088* (0.048)
Small community 0.263*** (0.055)
Large community -0.213*** (0.065)
in East Germany -0.228* (0.135)
Observations 537
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 01, 06; mothers 25-50 of children <= 6 with regular full or part
time job. Regression includes year, state, and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997 living in West Germany, in North
Rhine-Westphalia with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized
town in 2001, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not cared for by relatives.
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Table A.13: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for
(1) Low Educated and (2) High Educated Mothers
Commuter Commuter
(1) (2)
Married, living together 0.003 (0.071) 0.015 (0.095)
Number of children 0.057 (0.042) 0.022 (0.056)
Other than German nationality -0.438*** (0.108) -0.016 (0.217)
Children 0-2 -0.148* (0.086) 0.125 (0.093)
Log (Spouse’s income)† -0.019 (0.015) 0.019 (0.018)
Tenure in firm 0.008 (0.005) -0.000 (0.008)
Children cared for by relatives 0.097 (0.061) 0.106 (0.088)
Children in non-relative care 0.017 (0.086) -0.098 (0.133)
Small community 0.268*** (0.068) 0.260** (0.106)
Large community -0.222*** (0.082) -0.264** (0.119)
in East Germany -0.280* (0.156) 0.125 (0.232)
Observations 352 183
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 01, 06; mothers
25-50 of children <= 6 with regular full or part time job. Regressions include year, state, and age group dummies.
Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 2001 living in West Germany, in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives.
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